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ABSTRACT
A two-country, optimising model with capital accumulation, purchasing power
parity, floating exchange rates, uncovered interest parity, perfect
foresight, finite lives and population growth is developed and analysed. For
the special case of a zero birth rate, individuals are indifferent between
tax-finance and bond-finance or money-finance, so that Ricardian debt-
neutrality and super-neutrality prevail. The general case is analysed by
decomposing the model into global averages and differences. A tax-financed
increase in monetary growth leads to an interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect,
that is the world real interest rate falls and capital accumulation
increases. A home monetary expansion leads to an increase in home
consumption, and an increase in home holdings of foreign assets. If the
expansion occurs through open-market operations, money is super-neutral. The
international spill-over effects of tax-financed and bond-financed increases
in government spending and of bond-financed increases in lump-sum taxation
are also considered. Numerical methods are used to calculate the short-run
multipliers and to discuss the effects of imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods.
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~n increase in monetary growth reduces the real interest rate and
thereíore increases capital and output in the long run (Tobín, 196~), hence
money is not super-neucral. However, the existence of such a Tobin effect
is denied in optimising models with micro foundatiors as then the long-run
real ~nterest rate has to match the subjective rate of time preference
(Sidrausk" 1969). Obviously, non-neutralities can occur during the transient
path towards long-run equilíbríum ( Fischer, 1979a; Asako, 1983). Long-run
non-neutralities occur when money encers the production function ( Dornbusch
aná Frenkel, 1973; Físcher, 1974), when leisure encers the utility function
in a non-separable fashion (Brock, 1974), when the residual mode of government
finance is distortionary taxes, when there is population growth ( Weil, 1986),
or when lives are finite (van der Ploeg and Marini, 19 88).This paper focusses
on the last two sources of non-neutrality, which stress ~he dísconnectedness
of individuals and provide a micro foundation of the Tobin effect. It is assumed
that there is a positive birth rate and absence of an intergenerational bequest
motive. This means that taxes can be passed on to future (yet unborn) genera-
tions, so that debt-neutrality (Barro, 1974) and super-neutrality (Sidrauski,
1967) no longer ho1d.
So farY the discussion of the effects of monetar;~ growth on the real
inte-est rate and capital accumulation has been concerned with closed
economies. In small open economies the real interest rate is pegged to the
world real interest rate and therefore there is no Tobin effect. However,
the world consists of interdependenc economies and therefore a global Tobin
effect may be relevant. In an interdependent world with floating exchange
rates and perfect capital mobilíty, an increase in home monetary growth and
inflation increases the home nominal ínterest rate, reduces the world real
interest rate, and increases capital, output and employment, both at home and
abroad. When the Central 3anks care about output or consumption and inflation,r
J4.
-~-
one can show that in the absence of international policy coordination
monetary growch anà inflation are too 1ow, reai interest rates are too high,
anà capital, output and employment are too ïow (van der Ploeg, 1986). Since
an increase in monetary growth is a locomotive polícy, each country attempts
to transfer the burden of reducing the world real interest rate to the other
countries as this leaàs to an increase in activíty without an increase in
inflation. The objective of this paper is to reconsider these íssues wíthin
the context of a tSaa-c~uncry, opt;~is.ing--.model wízh . micro foundations, death
ar.d population growth. The advancage of such an approach is that careful
account is taken of the intertemporal budget constraints of governments and
private sector agents and that a more satisfactory welfare anaiysis is feasible.
Section 2 develops a two-councry model with fioating exchange rates,
uncovered interest parity and perfect foresight. Individuals have uncertain
lífetimes anà there is pooulation growth. The asset menu consists of home
equity, home money, and home and foreign government bonds. Section 3 considers
the special case of a zero birth rate, which occurs when agents have infinite
líves and when chere is no population growth. For this case any increase in
non-human wealth, due to an increase in jovernment debt, is exactly off-set
by a reduction in human wealth, arísing from the future taxes required to pay
off the additional government debt, hence ~icardian debt-neutralíty prevails.
Similarly, indivíduals are indifferent b~tween money-finance and tax-finance
and therefore super-neutrality holds. The Appendix decomposes the genersl two-
COUntry model into global averages and global differences, which simplifies
the analysis considerably. Section considers joint and unilateral increases
in monetary growth. When the resídual mode of government finance is lump-sum
taxation, one has an interdependent ~Iundell-Tobin effect. However, when the
increase in monetary growth occurs through open-market operations, money is
super-neutral. The effects of a home, tax-financed increase ín monetary growth-3-
are a fall in the worl~ real i~terest .~~e, an increase in giobal activity,
an increase ia home consumption, a ia11 in foreign consumption, an increase
in home hoidings of foreign assecs, and a home balance-of-trade deficit.
Sectíon 5 considers joint snd unilateral increases ín government spending,
both when they are tax-financed and when they are bond-financed, and Section
6 considers joint and unilateral bond-financed increases in lump-sum taxatíon.
Section ~ generalises the model to allow for imperfect substitut;on between
home and foreign goods and uses numerical simulation to compare the results
with those under purchasing power parity. Section 8 concludes the paper.i
a Two-countr~.. moàei -.~ith cao:cai , mone~ and go~ernment àebt
1 rinite 'ives anà tàe 'nàiviàuai's demand ~or Qoods and monev
balances
The àemand side oí each economy is made up of ídentical consumers wíth
constant life expectancy. There is no intergeneratíonal bequest motive, as
in the analysis of Blanchard (1985) and of Weil (1986). The supply of labour
at time t of a consumer born at time s ~ t, k(s,t), is inelastic, say
~,(s,t) s 1. The consumer has Cobb-Douglas preferences over the consumption-
of private goods, c(s,t), real money balances, m(s,t), and the
consumpcíon of public goods, g(t), and has an intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of unity. ~eenstra (1986) provides a justification, based on
liquidity costs, for entering money in the utility function. The consumer
faces the following optimisation problem:
:~.ax, ~f logt[c(s,v)Ym(s,v)y-Y]g(v)Y~;esp[(at5)(t-v)]dv, 0 ~ Y ~ 1
c,m t (2.1)
subject to the individual consumer's flow budget constraint,
àa(s,t)
dt -[r(t) t 3]a(s,t) f w(t) ~.(s,t) - z(s,t) - c(s,t)
- [r(t) 1 2(t)]m(s,t)~ (2.2)
and the condition prec'uáir.g ? onzí games.
v
lim exp{- j [r(u) á]du}a(v,t) ~ 0, (2-3)
where a denotes the subjective rate of tíme preference, 8 denotes the
constant instantaneous probability of death, w(t), r(t) and p(t) denote
the real wage, the real interest rate and the ínflatíon rate at time t,
respectively, and c(s,t), m(s,t), a(s,t) and z(s,t) denote the
consumption of goods, the holdings of real money baiances, real non-human
wealth and lump-sum taxation at time t of a consumer born at time s,-~-
resvectively. The iadíviáual consumer receives (pavs), for every period of
hís 1ife, a premium, da(s,t), and at the time oi death the índividual's
nec wealth ( debt) goes to (is canceïïeá by) the lïfe insurance company. :he
premium is actuarially iair, so that this f ormuiation corresponds to effícient
iife insurance or annuities market. Equation ( 2.3) ensures that the
individual does not run up an inàefinite debt. Sínce the probability of
death is B, the subjective rate oï time preference and the real rate ot
return are efT`ectively increased 5y this amounc.
Total consumption, u(s,t), consists of consumption of goods plus
interest i~cegone oi. noney ho~dings, that is
u(s,t) - c(s,t) -- [r(t) f- P(t)lm(s,t). (2.4)
The optimisation then yields c(s,t) -~u(s,t), m(s,t) - (1-~)u(s,t)~[r(t)tp(t)]
and the "tilt" of the tocal consumvtion runction, du(s,t)~dt -[r(t) - a]u(s,t).
Vote that the individual consumer ensures that the marginal rate of substitution
between goods and real money balances equals the opportunity cost of holding
real :noney balances, i.e., the nominal interest rate, and thac the elasticity
of money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate is unity. If one
deLines human wealth as the present discounted value of after-ta~c wage income,
n(s~t) - ml [w(v)I(s,v) - z(s,'~)] eYpi- vi [r(u) } a]du}dv (2.3)
t c
where the díscount rate equals the real interest race plus the probability of
death, one can write total consumption as
u(s,t) - (a-~d)(a(s,t) ;-i(s, t) ] , (2.6)
The consumption function is linear in human plus non-human wealth, because
the intertemporal elasticity of substitutíon is assumed to be unity. This-ó-
assumption ~acilitates the aggregation across indiviáuals born at the same
instant. Blanchard (1985) àiscusses the implications or general iso-elastic
utility functions for non-monetary economies.
2.? A~gre~ation across individuals and vovulation growth
Buitez i198 g)extends the aggregation procedure of Yaari (1965) and
Blanchard (1985) to allow for population growth and extends the aggregatíon
procedure of Weil (1986) to allow for finite lives. This extension allows
for overlapping families of finitely-iived individuals and is applied here.
At each instant a new cohort is born. The siae of each cohort grows
at a constant rate, so that the size of the cohort born at time t equals
(nfB)exp(nt), where n denotes the constant rate of population growth.
The síze at time t or the surviving cohort born at time s ~ t equals
(ntB)exp(ns)exp[- B(t-s)], since B ís the probability of death. The total
t
population at time t equals (ntB) f exp(ns)exp[- 3(t-s)]ds - exp(nt).
- a
The per-capita population aggregate for, say, total consumption, is defined
as
t
U(t) - (n~-B) J u(s,t)exp[(n~-3)(s-t)]ds, (2-i)
because the ~opulation aggregate is obtained as the sum of the total
consumption of all surviving cohorts at time t, u(s,t), s ~ t, times the
size of the surviving cohort, (ntB)exp(ns)exp[- B(t-s)] and the per-capita
populatíon aggregate is obtained by divíding the population aggregate by the
population size, e:cp(nt). Other per-capita population aggregates are
obtained in a similar manner and are denoted by a capital letter,
Application of this aggregatíon procedure yields:4
C(t) - YU(t)
~(t) - (1-Y)U(t)~[r(t) 1 P(t)]
U(t) - [r(t) - a]U(t) - (nt3)(a-B}A(t)
~(t) x[r(t) - nJ~(t) } w(t) - Z(t) - U(t)





the non-human wealth of nesa]..~ .born. individuals must be zero, a(t,t) ~ 0.
Unlike (2.2), (2.11) no longer contains a life-insurance premium as they
efíectively constitute a transfer from those who die to those who survive and
therefore they do not afíect the return on aggregate non-human wealth.
aggregation of human wealth, (2.5), vields H~(ry-B)H - w y Z. Upon
substitution of this and the aggre~ate consumption function, U - (c.~g) (AfH) ,
into (2.11), one obtains the "tilt" oí the aggregate consumption function,
(2.10).
2.3 Production
The production side of each economy follows from a concave and twice
dïfïerer.tíable consrant-returns-to-scale production function,
y(t) - f(k(t),2(t)) where y(t), k(t) and .Z(t) denote aggregate
production, the capital stock and employment at time t, respectively. The
value of the firm, v, follows from the condition for risk-neutral arbitrage
.e
between equity and ocher financial assets, that ís rv - v f(y - wk - i)
whe:e í denotes gross investment. Hence, shareholders equate the return on
equity, í.e., capital gaíns plus dividends, to the real return on alternative
assets. Integration of this arbitrage condítion gives an expression for the
value of the firm,-~-
m v
v(t) - ' ,-(k(v), ~.(v)) - w(v)3.(v) - -(v)lex.;- ( r(u)dujdv ('.-?)
wnich simpiv represents the present àiscounteà value of fucure profits.
yaximisation of táe vaiue of tne -i~ subject to the capital accumulation
conditior., k-,- ók wnere ó áenoces the àepreciation rate, yields
:~(k,~.) ~ w anà `k(k,x.) ~ r- c. ln other words, the margínal prod~ict of
labour eauais the real wage aná the marginal product of capital equals the
user cost of capital, i. e., the rentai charge plus depreciation chazge mínus
capital gains. Tire:g are ao acj nstment- ens'~:-assaciateà with investment, so
that Tobin's "Q" ís unity anà therefore v~ k. Labour maricet equilibríum
gives Q(t) ~ exp(nt). Ir. per-capita units, one has f'(K) s r,
f(K) - Kï' (i~) - w and K- T-(órn)K, K(0) ~ K0, where
K(t) - k(t)esp(-nt), I(t) - i(t)exp(-nt) and nec per-capita outpuc is
g-ven b~ -(K) - i(K,') - óK.
Tne escess of net outpuc over wages plus dividends, ï~ -~(K,1) - w- ï,
-e
must ecual the CaDltál gains on equity, that is f- Z- w- V f nV. Since
. P
í(F~) - rK , w, one has 7, V- -(r - n)V.
2.4 Financial assets and the government budget constraint
The asset menu of consumers consist of home cash, home government bonds,
foreign government bonds and home (and foreign) equity. Since home equity,
home government bonds and foreign government bonds are perfect substitutes,
the results also hold for the case when there is international trade in
equities. Hence, there is no currency substitution and money can be treated
as a non-traded good. Home and foreign government bonds are perfect substi-
tutes, so that non-human wealth corresponds to A- MtBtV where B denotes the
per-capita holdings of home and foreign government bonds by home individuals.
The government spends on goods, levies lump-sum taxes and finances the
deficit by printing money or issuing government debt. This is captured by the
government budget constraint.
D 3(r-r.)D ~- G- Z- ~M, ~(~) -~~ (?.1~)t
-~-
::here D(t) áenotes the per-capita goverZment áebt issued to home and
~oreígn individuals at tíme t, G(t) - g(t)eYp(-nt) denoces per-capita
governmenc spenàing at time t and 9(t) àenotes the growth rate of the
aggregate nomiaal money supply. Seignorage revenues are represented by the
term 6M. Integration of (2.13) and application of the solvency (no Ponzi
games) condition yields ~
D(t) ~ jr [Z(v) t A(v)M(v) - G(v)]expí- V~ [r(u) - n]duldv, (2.13')
t t
so that the current real government debt has to be paid off by the presenc
discounted value of the excess of future lump-sum taxes and seignorage
revenues over government spending. ~Iote that finite lives and population
growth drive a wedge between the àiscount race used to calculate government
debt, r- n, and the discount rate used to calculate human wealth, r t 3.
Equilibrium in the money market is represanced bv
M - (6 - p - n)M, :1(0) - free. (2.14)
Since the economies are classical without any rigidities, the price
level clears the goods markets and depends on e~cpected future events. This
implies that the inítial price Leve1 and the initial per-capita holdings of
real money balances, ~(0), are free to jump.
Each government has four policy instruments, viz., G, Z, g and D, of
which three can be chosen freely and the fourth follows residually from the
government budget constraint. Under bond-finance it is assumed that G and ~
are exogeneous policy instruments,Z is an endogeneous policy instrument and
follows from a feedback rule, and D follows from the government budget con-
straint. A feedback rule for lump-sum taxation is required, because in the
absence of such a rule the solvency of the government is not ensured and
therefore the- 1 V -
goverament àebt eYpiodes. y sensi~oie -ax ~ule
- ;. D - ~..,D, (Z.'~)
so Lcat taxes are raised wnen tne reai government àebt is high or when tàere
is a.over:lmeat surplus. Soivency usually reauires êD~óD -(r-n-S~)~.(1;1) ~ 0,
so thaL either ~` ~ r- n anà ~` ~ 0 or ;~ ~ 0 and ; 1 ~ 1 is assumeà.
:vote thaL, :or E., s C, a long-run increase in taxation, ~C, is precedeà
bv a short-run cut in taxation, Z~ í- ,,, ;~, [(r-n)D ~ G- 9:~iJ }~ (~i-1) .
~ V 1
Obviously, an increase in government spenàing or fall ia seignorage revenues
reauires an increase in taxation. The case of tax-finance (Da0) corresponds
to El w m~ so tnat Z-(r-a)DC - G-??".. -rom now on, it wi11 be assumed
that the tax -uie is given by Z- ~,C -;1D (i.e., ~` - 0). Note that only the
aggregate 1eve1 of lump-sum taxes matters for the aggregate per-capita variables,
so that the distribution of taxes across generations does not affect aggregate
per-capita variables.
2.5 The international context
:he world cor.sists cf two econoc~ies with identical preferences,
tec:~nologies and demograpnic structures. The zoreign country has similar
relationshins to the ones díscussed in Sections 2.1-2.4 and its variables
are denoted by an asteris~c. There is :~o labour mobility between the two
countries and there is no international market for equity. However, there
are ei:icier.t international 3arkets ~or goods and government ~or.ds. ~n ~act,
it is assumed that there is ?eriect substitut'on betc:een home and foreign
croducts as ::e11 as between home ar.d ~oreign gover::ment bonds. Hence,
(relative) purchasing power parity, p(t) - px(t) - e(t) ahere e(t) denotes
the rate of depreciat'on of the nominal e~cchange rate at time t, and
uacovered inCerest parity, r(t) ~- p(t) - r~(t) - p~(t) ~- ee(t), must ho1d.
iogether with the assumption of peT~ecL foresíght, one has equalisation of
real interest rates, r(t) - r~(t). It foilows from f`(K) ~ f'(~:~) - r-11-
chat tne home and `oreign caoital stocks must also 'oe the same, iC - K~,
anà that chereíore .wage rates must óe .he same, w - w~.
The "1aw of one price" impiies thac there is a world. market for goods
íor which the e4uilibrium condition is
Y t Y~ - C t C~ f L-~ I~ t G t G~, (2.16)
where Y~ f(K,1) denoces per-capita gross output. Nec holdir.gs of foreign
assets are the excess of pr-cate ~se~ctor ~agents'~ holdings of bor.ds ovcr
government debc, that is F- B- D. The condition for equilíbrium in the
world market for government bonds is B t B~ - D f D~, which implies that
F~ -- F. The balance of trade is the excess of domestic production over
domestic absorptions, Y- C- I- G. Together with interest on net foreígn
assets it gives the current account,
F-(r-n)F -~ Y- C- I- G, F(0) - FG,
which equals che increase in wealth of the nation. ~Iote that subtraction or
K- I-(0~-n)K, (2.13) and (2.14) from (2.11) yíelds ( 2.17). Lntegration of
(2.17) and application of the country`s solvency ( no 2onzi games) conàition
gives
v
F~(t) - ~[y(v) - C(v) - I(v) - G(v)~expi- J[r(u) - n~du}dv, (2.17')
t t
so that the current debt of the nation eventually has to be paid off by
íuture savings' surplusses of the óovernment and privace sector (i.e., by
future balance-of-trade surplusses).
The solution of the comnlete model is described in the Appendix.4
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3. Su~er-neutralitv and debt-Zeut-alitv
Since the áeath rate is 3 and the populacion growth race is n,
táe birth rate must equal n- 3. The birth rate is exactly the weáge
becween the discount rate used to calculate human wealth, r 1 B, and the
díscount rate used to calculace the government debt, r- n. If the birth
rate is zero, this wedge is zero and therefore it is no longer possible for
society to pass taxes on to future generations. This implies thac índivíduals
are indifferenc between tax-íinance and bond-finance of the government deficit,
because an increase in government áebt.has to be paid off .by future taxes and
the áiscounted value of these taxes reduces human wealth by exactly the same
amount as non-humaa aealth is increased. Hence, Rícardian debc-neutrality (cf.,
3arro, 197~:) prevails wnen the birth rate is zero.
For a zero birth race, one has U- U~,
K- f(K) - nK - YU -`~(GtG~), K(0) - KG, (3.ï)
F-[f'(K) - n]F f z(G~-G), F(0) - F0
(3.')
and
U a [f' (K) -~ ~~.]U, U(0) - free. (3.3)
Clearly, increases in monetary growth (induced by open market operations) at
home or abroad (6, A~) have no effect on the real interest rate, capital, out-
put, consumption of goods or investment and therefore super-neutrality (cf.,
Sidrauski, 1967) holds. They increase the inflation and nominal interest rates
one-for-one and thus reduce holdings of real money balances, so that economic
welfare falls. Real seignorage revenues increase (see equation (5.4)), which
permits the servicing of a greater government debt as lump-sum taxes are
unaffected. In fact, the fall in non-human wealth, caused by the fall in real.
-13-
~oney balances, is exactly oïf-set by the increase ~n r.on-human ~Nealth, caused
by the i ncrease i n noiàings oi bonàs, so that total wealth and consumption are
unaffecteà. Super-neutrality oï monetary grc also 'r.olàs when lumo-sum taxes
ratner ~han bonàs are the resiàual :noàe of government finance. ~n that case, the
fa11 in non-human wealtr, is exactly off-set by the increase in human wealth,
caused by the fall in lump-sum taxes.
It is easy to shov that, for a zero birth rate, d~(9)~cG - dK~(m)~dG a 0,
QC(m)~Cv ~ dCx(~~~dG ~-~ aP.d d:(m}~d.ri ~ ~~(C-n~, 50 C~laC d::Y 1nC-csSE ?Z
real gove-nmenc spendi::g is comoletely crowded ouc by a reàuccíon in privace
consuWpc;on and there-ora has r.o e~fect on tàe real incerest rate, capital
SCOC-t Or OCIC7uC. Ti12 d550C;aC2d t~ad2 deL1C1t5 liuD1V a t-ansienc ~ore;gn
debt, but --. .áe 'ong -;:n -~us: be associaced ..zt:-1 nec ~oreígn assecs (i-
z ~ C), uDr2 -WDOrcantly, t:ze ~ransiezc and steady-state e-~ects o~ gover-:ment
sperèi,~ cn capi-al, oucpuc aná consumpc'on do coc deaend oz ::hec:~er it is
--:a:c-d by nonev, bonds or taxes. 3ond-f'nance ~oday is :oc ?erceived as an
-ncrease -:a 2r-~race sector ::eaitá, because the discouncad value oz the cucure
Lumo-sum or 'nilation taxes reauired to ?ay oé~ che deóc exactly equals today's
;acraase ia ~overnmenc debc. it ís 3150 obvious t:~ac, :rhen the birth rata is
zero, c::anges :II :1mD-Sll~ taxac-on zave zo real e~~ects.
Voca t`~ac .:~e deatZ race is :r-eievanc :or t:~ese zeucraL-c,~ r-sults.
?or esamoLa, ecor.cmies ~icz a oosit-~e deatz raca and a zero bir.`.: raca
(~ ~- Z~ 0} `:ave a dec'ini::g ?oouiacion and are characterised by super-
aeuc-al:ty and debc-neucral-cy.
In t:~e L:3ht oc the above discussion, -~ say be use-ul to relac- cze
t:ro-counc.y moáeL ?resenced ía Sact-on 2 to some ?revíous models. I~ oae
assumes zero population growth, infinite lives and no government debt
(n - e- D- D~ - 0), the present model corresponds to a two-country
extension of the money-capital, closed-economy model developed by Sidrauski
;1967). ~n such a world long-run super-neutrality holàs, that is, monetary
growth is unable to affect the steady-state outcomes of real variables, even
though (for weakly non-separable rather than Cobb-Douglas preferences) there-14-
mav be snort-run neutralities ~iscner, i979b: -,sako. 1983). -f one assu:nes
zero population growth, `inite iives anà no government àebt (n - D- 3~ - 01,
the oresent moàel corresponàs to a two-country extension of the closeà-economy
moàei àevelopeà by i9arini and van der P1oeg (19 8 8).In that case, an increase in
monetary growth with lump-sum taxes as the resiàual mode of government finance
reduces the real interest rate, increases capital, increases seignorage reven-
ues and therefore reduces lump-sum taxes by the same amount, increases both
human and total wealth, and increases the consumption of goods. Finite lives
clearly destroys the super-neutrality result. Similarly, an increase in govern-
ment spending increases the interest rate, reduces capital, real money balances,
::u~an veaitZ ar.d zon-àuman ::ealch, incrzases lumo-sum taxacion, reáuces
Se-o::ora;e r?V2CUe5 , aild ~e'd5 CO L:Or2 C.'lan -~0~ CrOwQiA?~ OL1C OL 7r-VaCe
co:a uWotion. -à cne ass;:aes ~ositive ?oouiacion g-octh ar.d -nfiaitz lives
(3 ~ 0), tZe ?rasenc ~odel cor~zsponàs co a t.o-cour.cry extension of the
c-osed-econcny áeveloged by ~ei1 (1586). ~ei1 :'zds t`~ac popuiation 3rowtá
ai rv -s SuL:'C'zat '.o áest-cy t`:e -ong- n:n superneucraiity of ~onetary grovtz.
~e r-ason -s, CL ~LL1r52, .:at C:':e 3overn~e::t Catl La:C 70tZ C:20s2 -::dividuals
c.~r-er.t'y alive ar.d L:ose ~~dividuals ;~et to ~e bot-i. ïn -acc, 't zas already
4ee, ar5ued zbove t.`.at a aecessary and suz::c'enc conditíon -or super-zeut-ality
-s ~aac ~~e tot~1 7':ta -aL2 -s zero.
31aac;:a.3 ('S85) shous, -or a closed eccnony ait:ouc money ar.à capital,
~;at :'a~t- 'ives destroy 3ar-o's (1974) result .`or 3ícard~an áebc-neutrality
and weil (1986) shows che same for popuiation growth. Buiter (19 8 8)shows,
for a closed economy wit`~out money and capital, that a necessary and sufficient
condition for Ricardian debc-neutrality is that the total birth race, i.e.,
t:~e sum of the population growth rate anà the probability of death, must be
zero.-15-
4. uonetarv oolicv
4.1 Steaáv-state effects of a ioint increase in monetarv growth
The case of tax-fíaance is considereà first. The relevant steadv-state,
tax-financeà muitiplíers for multilateral increases in monecary growth are
gíven bv (see Appendix) :
(dKa(m)1d6a]TF z - (nt8)(at6)YMIGTF ~ 0
[dUa(m)IdAa]T~ z - (ntB)(atBj(r-a)MI~TF ~ u
[dMa(m)Id6a]TF s - .~~1{YUf" - (nt6)(o~-B)[((w-Z)IU) - (1-Y))}I~TF
(~ - YMUf"I~TF ~ 0),
(4.2)
(4.3)
so that [dr(m)Idea]TF --
(nt8)(a-r8)yMf";~TF ~ 0. Hence, as long as tne
total birth rate is positive, a joint increase in monetary growth leads in
the ïong run to a one-for-one increase in inflation, an increase in nomínal
interest rates, a fall in the world real interest rate, increases in global
capital, output and consumption of goods, and a fa11 in real money balances.
These multipiiers remínd one of the conventional `Iundell-Tobin effect, yet they
are deríved from a general equilibríum model with micro foundations. This
break-down of super-neutrality arises, because a positive birth rate drives
a wedge between the discount rate used to calculate human wealth and the one
used to calculate jovernment debt and therefore drives a wedge between the
real interest rate and the rate of time preference.
The steady-state effect on real seignorage revenues is given by
[d6~ía(m)Idt3a]T~- {Y(r-n)Uf" f (nT6) (at3) [YMf" - (r-n) (w-Z)~U] }M~~TF ~ 0'
(4.a)
hence an increase in global monetary growth raíses s-~ignorage revenues (despite-16-
a fali in real monev balances) and therefore reàuces lump-sum taxes. Human
wealth increases, because lump-sum taxes fa11 and because (with a posítive
birth rate) wage income increases and the real incerest race falls. The
increase in human wealth more than off-sets any fa11 in non-human wealth, so
that total wealth and consumption of goods rises. Obviously, joint increases
in monetary growth have no effects on net foreign assecs.
The increase in the consumntion .af ~nods. incLe.ases. global welfare,
whilst the increase in inflation and fall in real money balances reduce global
welfare, so that the net effect on global welfare ís ambiguous.
The above results provide a counter-example to Sidrauski's (1967) result
on super-neutrality. These results hold for tax-financeà increases in
monetary growth, but not for bond-financed increases ín monetary growth even
:rhen the birth rate ís positive (see AppendiX) :
(dKa(m)~dóa]~F - [dUa(m)~d8a]BF - [àr(m)IdEa]SF - 0




It is aot surprising that under bond-finance changes in monetary growth do
noc affect real outcomes in the long run, because lump-sum taxes and therefore
human wealth are unaffected by bond-finance in the long run (Z -~D -~1D -~0).
It therefore does not matter that the birth rate drives a wedge between the
díscount rate ~lsed to calculate human wealth and the one used to calculate
the government debt, so that real outcomes are unaffected in the long run.
The optimal monetary poiicy is then for each government to implement Friédman`s
(1969) fuïl liquidity rule, that is dríve the nominal interest rates to zero
and holdings of real money balances to infínity by settíng the monetary growth
rates to the difference between the population growth rate and the rate of-17-
time preference (2 -~~ - n- a). Obviously, when the tax rule àeoends on
the stocic of government àebt (say, ~-~~ - 5,,~), monecary growth aífects
1llmD-sum taxation aná therefore afiects real outcomes in the long run.
rThen the total birth rate is zero (n - 3~ 0), the effects on real
money balances and seignorage revenues are exactly the same as with tax-
financed monetary growth. Since seignorage revenues increase, the government
can afford to service larger stocks of government debc. There are no effects
on-totai lhumaa plus non-human)..~ealth. This reflects the Ricardían debt
equivalence proposition (e.g., Barro, 1974), because the increase in human
wealth arising from the reàuction in taxes under the tax-financed increase in
monetary growth is exactly the same as the increase in bonds under the bond-
financed increase in monetary growth. Hence, for n f 3- 0, one has
d6a
- dHa(m) ~ 3 - i dM(m) ~ - `~ ~ 0.
a a - at3-n
BF L à6 -~T` ~- a 5 - BF,TF
~,lso, when the birth rate is zero, the long-run effects on social welfare
are independent of the residual mode of finance.
(4.7)
Fínally, when the birth rate is positive and preferences are non-
separable in consumocion and real :noney balances, bond-financed ;nonetary
growth can have real effects in the long run ( cf., Marini and van der Ploeg,
1988). The reason is that monetary ~rowth affects the nominal interest rate,
whích in turn affects the proportion spenc on consumption of goods. Bond-
financed increases in monetary growth decrease ( increase) capital and
consumptíon when che elasticity of substitution between goods and real money
balances is less ( greater) than unity.-18-
4.2 Steadv-state e~-ects o: a unilateral -ncrease monetar~ erowth
~gain, the case of tax-finance is considered first. The relevant steady-
stace, tax-financeá muïtioliers for uni'ateral íncreases in monetary growth
are (see Appendix):
(dF(m)Id6d]TF - - -~(ntB)(at8)YMI~TF ~ 0
[dUd(m)Id6d]TF - - (ntB)(ató)(r-n)MI~aF ~ 0
[dMd(~)Ided]TF - (nt3)(atB)M[((w-Z)IU) - (1-Y)]I~TF ~ 0.
Use of (A, 3) and (A. 4) yieids




[dU~(~) Id8]TF - ?(n-r6) (a1-B) (r-n)MYf" [ (rf~-n)U f ( nt8) (a-~B)MJ I (~TF~TF) ~ 0,
(d.12)
so that [dC(m)Ide]TF ~ 0 and [dC~(m)d~]TF ~ 0. Similarly,
[dM(m)Idg]TF - - zM{YUf" f (nt3)(atS)[1 - Y - (w-Z)IU](1 f
~TFIOdF)}I~TF
(~ - 1-~,rYUf"I~aF ~ 0)
and
(4.13)
[dM~(m)Ide]TF - - ~M{YUf" f (nt8)(atB)[1 - Y - (w-Z)IU](1 - ~TFI~TF)}I~TF
(~ - .MYUf"I~TF)
as OTF ~~TF ~ 0 (and w~ Z f(rt?-n)M is assumed to hold).
(4.14)
For the case of a zero birth rate, global monetary growth is super-
neutral and therefore does not affect average consumpcion. It follows that-19-
the posit've effect of home monetary growth on home consumption is exactly
of:-sec by the negative effecc on foreign consumpcior.
((dC(~);d~jTT --(dC~(m)Id6]TF ~ 0 for n t~ z 0). In general, the birth
rate i s positive, unilaceral monetary growth is non-neutrai and therefore
the positive effect on home consumption outweíghs the negative effect on
foreign consumption.
The increase in home monetary growth rate, in general (n t S~ 0),
leads to an equal increase in.home inflation (p z 9T), a(smaller) increase
in che home nominal interest rate (r t pT) and a fall in the world real
interest rate (r z r~-). This increases capital accumulation and output,
both at home and abroad (K - K~', Y- y~'). This is the two-country version
of the ~undell-Tobin efáect. coreign inflation i s unaffected. This means
that each country has an incentive to transfer the burden of reducing the
world real interest race and increasing world activit~ to the other country,
because then it does not need to increase its own monetary growth and inflation
rate whilst it does get the increase in activity (cf., van der Ploeg, L986a).
Since the opportunity cost of holding money balances increases at home
and decreases abroad (r~ f p~-), it is relatively less attractive to hold
monev for home-agents than it is for foreign agents. There is, therefore,
an incentive for home agents to buy bonds from foreign agents (B`, B~1), so
that the home (foreign) country accumulates foreign assets (debt) (Fr). The
interest payments on net foreign assets allows the home country to run a
balance-of-trade deficit, so that home agents can afford to consume more than
foreign agents (C, lit, C~, li~-).
~ence, even though there is a positive spi11-over effect of home monetary
growth on foreígn capital and output, there is a negative spíll-over effect
on foreign consumption of goods and this decreases foreign social welfare.-?.0-
ihe net e~:ect on foreign social welfare àepenàs on what :lappens to foreign
holdings of real money balances. The lower opportunity cost of holding
:oreign money baiances tenàs to increase it, whiïst the lower levels of
foreign total consumption and total wealth tend to decrease it, so that the
net effect on hoidings of foreígn money balances is ambíguous (M~l'). For
sma11 (large) values oï the birth rate, foreign money balances decline
(increase) and therefore foreign social welfare unambiguously decreases (might
increase).
Seignorage reve.nues at home increase (6Mt), whích allows the home
government to cut taxes (Z:). Human wealth of home agencs increases,
because the wage increases (wt), lump-sum taxes fall and the real interest
rate falls. ~1on-zuman wealth of home agents can decrease when the fall in
home real money balances outweighs the increase ín home equity and bond
holdings, but any fa11 must be dominated by the increase in human wealth as
total wealth ot home agents increases (A f Ht). The effect on foreígn
seignorage revenues is ambiguous ~(S~"1~-t), so that the effect on foreign
taxes and human wealth is ambiguous. The effect on foreign non-human wealth
is also ambíguous, because the ra11 in foreign bond holdings may or may not
be outweighed by the íncrease in foreign equity and the possible increase in
foreign real money balances. However, total foreign ~aealth decreases(?.~ 7- H~-).
Now consider the case of bond-finance (~ ~ 0). A unilateral bond-
fínanced increase in monètary growth has no effect on real activity (see
equation (c},5~)and, simílarly, it has no effect on net foreign assets in
the long run ([dF(m)~d9]SF - 0). The reason is again that Iong-run taxation
is unaffected.-21-
4.3 Ovnamic oo'icv simuiation
:able 2 shows the :r.pact and steaàv-state eïïects of a tax-financeà
increase of 10 percentaee points in monetary growth at áome aad abroaà. Since
it is a ~~oint increase, there is no effect on the baiance of traàe, the
current accounc or the accumulation of foreign assets. In the loag run, the
real interest rate fa11s by 0.46 percentage points, so that the capital stocic
increases by 4.45~ and output and the real wage by 0.89;. Fiowever, on impact
these variabïes are unaffected. The inflation rate iumps up on impact by
9.54 percentage poínts and then graàually rises to 10 percentage points.
This immediately increases the opportunity cost of hoiding monev balances, so
that reaï money 'oalances anà non-human wealth fa 11 on impact by 121.~3~. and
48.~ii., thereby overshooting their steaày state by 2.33i and 2.36~.,
respectiveiy. The ~~ncrease in seignorage revenues aermits a cut ir, taxation
of 36.~9é, which gradually ríses to y0.~ó~., and an increase in human wealth
of 13.23~e, which gradually rises to 15.:3i.. The overshooting of real money
balances can aïso be seen in the behaviour oL total wealth and consumocion:
on iulDaCt they fail by 2.22Z and in the long run they increase by 0.117.
Instantaneous welfare aiso overshoots, since on iapact it falls by 26.067.
ar.d in the long run `oy 23. i 37.
Table 3 shows the impact and steady-state effects of a tax-fina..ced
increase of 10 percer.cage points in home monetary growth. The effects on
the real interest rate, investment, capital stock, output and the wage rate
and on the global averages of a11 ocher variables are exactly half of what
they are ur.der a joint increase in :aonetary growth. In other words, in the
long run there is an interdependenc Mundell-TObin effect, so that a unilateral
increase in monetary growth boosts investnent and ~roduction at home and
abroad. ~t home the increase in seignorage revenues permits a short-run cut-22-
ín taxation of Z,'.31é, which increases human wealth by ï.98ó. On impact,
home real money balances and non-human wealth fall by 126.86i, and ~0.75é,
whích ensures that home total wealth and consumption fall by 6.70~. Abroad,
the anticipation of higher wage races, lower taxation, and lower interest
rates boosts human wealth on impact by ~.267. Foreign real money balances
and non-human wealth increase by ~.44;~ and 2.18' on impact. Hence, foreign
total wealth and consumpcion increase by 4.497 on ímpact. Both at home and
abroad, real money balances and total wealth overshoot their equilibrium
values, so that total wealth and consumption at home and abroad misadjust ín
the short run. This causes instantaneous welfare at home to fall by 30.73~
on impact and therefore to overshoot by 8.427. and instantaneous welfare
abroad to increase bv 4.687 on impact and to fall by 1.41~ in the long run.
5, c iscal oo licy
~.1 Steadv-state effects of a joínt increase in government saending
Consider the case where taxes are the resídual ;node of finance first.
The steady-state multipliers for a j lobal tax-financed fiscal expansion are
(see Appendix):
[dKa(m)IdGa]TF - (nf~) (czf3) (1-Y) (3;-i~)I(`S~TF) ~ 0
(5.1)
LdCa(m)IdGa]TF - - 1 t [ (ntB) (atB) (1-Y) (r-n) (BfK)I(~fOTF) ] ~ - 1 (5.2)
[d~a(~)IdGaJTF - - (1-Y){tif" - ( nf8)Cat6)[1 - ~,f"I(rt6-n)]}IDTF ~ 0.
(5.3)
With a zero birth rate (n f 8- 0), the fall in human wealth, real money
baiances and therefore private wealth ensures that the joint increase in
government spending ís completely crowded out by a fall in private consumption
of goods. Hence, there is no ezfect on the real interest rate, capital-23-
M
or output. ~he fa11 in human wealth ís àue to the increase in taxation,
which is reauired to finance the increase ia government spending and the
~a11 in seignorage revenues.
:víth a positive birth rate (n f B~ 0), real money balances, non-
human wealth, human wealth and private consumption of goods fall by a greater
amount, so that there is a ríse in the real interest rate, crowding out of
private investment and a fa11 in output. Taxes also have to maice up for the
drop in seignorage revenues, so that they increase by more than the increase
in govertiment spending. Human wealth falls for three reasons: wage income
falls; lump-sum taxes íncrease; and the annuity value of after-tax wage income
falls due to the rise in the world real incerest rate. Social welfare
declines, because consumption or both goods and real money balances falls.
Obviously, socíal welfare falls if government spendíng ís of the "hole-in-
the-ground" variety (Y' - 0). Eiowever, íf goverament spendinj gíves utility
to private sector agents (Y' ~ 0), social welfare may increase.
Consider now the case where bond issues are the residual mode of
government fínance. Thé releváric steady-state muitiptiers are (see Appendix):
[dKa(m) I dGa] ~F - (nf3) (atB) (w-yC) (r~-9-n) I (L'~a) ~ 0 (5.4)
0 ~ [dCa (~) IdGa] ~F - - 1 f [ (n-t-B) (af3) (r-n) (1-Y) (w-SC) ~I (-M-~a) ] ~ - 1
(5.5)
[d`i3(~) IdGa] BF - { (r-n) (1-Y)U l (nfá) (af6) [ (L-Y)((r-n)(rt6-n)
la ~ ~) - Y,~]}~ f~,I oa
(5.6)
[dDa(m)IdGa]~F - {Y(r-n)Uf" f SUf" f (nt3)(af6)[f"[YM f (1-Y)D(A-`1)I:~1
t (1-Y) ~AI (rt~3-n) ] - (1-Y) (w-S~) I:~1] }~I na (~ 0) . (5.7)
when the birth rate is zero (n f~- 0), a bond-financed multilateral increase-24-
in government soending is compiecely crowded out by the fall in privace
consumption and therefore there are no ef~ects on the real interest rate,
the capital stock and output. The fall in real money balances is the same
as in the tax-financed case, so that the fall in the holdings of bonds in the
bond-fínanced case is exactly the same as the fail in human wealth ín the
tax-financed case. This is yet again a manifestation of the Rícardian debt
equivalence proposition.
vow consider the general situation with a positive birth rate. `1'ne
main difference with the tax-financed case is that the fall in private
consumption leads to less than 1007. crowding out of government spending,
which implies a fall in the real interest rate and an increase in capital
and output. ïn contrast to the tax-iinanced case, human wealth rises as the
wage increases and the annuity value or wage income increases due to the fall
in the interest rate. The erfect on reai monev balances is aow ambiguous,
because on the one hand total consumption ~alls and on the other hand the
opportunity cost of holding real money balances declines. The government
debt must fa11 in the long run as the increase in government spending means
that the government can aíford Less interest payments. (In the short run the
government debt can, or course, increase). Ln fact, the fall in the real
interest rate (when the birth rate is positive) implíes that it is easier to
service the government debt and therefore bond 'noldings do not fa11 as much:
0 ~ (dDa(m)IdGaJ~F - - (r-n)-1 -
(n~g)(afS)(w-~0)f"D~(UDa) ~ - (r-n)-1.
e-o
(5.8)
~ 2 Steady-state etfects of a unilateral increase in ~overnment spendin
Consíder the case of tax-finance first. The relevant steady-state
multipliers for the global differences are (see Appendix):-25-
àF(m) I dGc~ - ~í(n ~) ía--) í--Y) í~:T3), l"-ra ~~ 0
iF -L
[dCd(m)IdGd],~F - (n~B)(at8)Y(rt9-n)ICaF ~ G
[d-~Idím)ldGd]TF - ín,-d) (at6) (ï-Y)I~TF ~ 0.




(dC(m)ídG]TF s- ~ t-~(ntB)(at3)[(1-Y)(r-n)(BtK)I(H~aF) t Y(r}6-n)I~TF] ~-~i
- (5.12)
[dC~(m)IdG]T~ s - -~ } ~(nt8)(at8)[(1-Y)(r-n)(B-}K)I(M~T~.) - YCrt6-n)I~TF]
~ [dC(m)IdG]T~. (5.13)
Consiàer the case of a zero birth rate (n ~ 3- 0) first. A tax-financed
increase in home government spenàing then has no effects on the wage rate,
the real interest rate, the capital stock or the level of output, because the
increase ~n home government spending is completely crowded out by the fa11 ín
home and foreign consumption ([d(C(~) f C~(~))ÍdG]TF 3- 1 for n f 3~ 0).
Home consumption falls by more than the increase in government
consumption, so that there is more than 100x crowding out in the long
run
([dC(~)IdG]TF - - ~ - ~?l(1-~)-1(rt8-n)M(w-Z-9M)-1 - -1 - ~(r-n)(BtK)~
(w-Z-BM) ~-1 for n t~- 0). As a result there is a home balance-of-
trade surplus, which finances the additional interest payments on the
accumulated foreign debt of the home country ([dF(~)~dG]TF --~r(KtB)~(w-
Z-8M) ~ 0 for n t S- 0).(In the short run there are, of course, trade
deficits which lead to an increase in foreign debt). Foreign consumption
increases, so that the foreign country has a trade deficit in the long
run. Real money balances at home fall, but abroad they may increase.
Foreign non-human and total wealth and home total wealth fall, but home
non-human wealth may increase. The incipient excess demand for goods on
the world market leads to a rise in the home price level (fall in home
real money balances) and, typically, a rise in the foreign price level,
which causes home and foreign agents to reduce their demand for goods.-26-
In general, birth rates are positive ( n } p~ 0), so that a tax-
financed increase in home government spending increases the world real
interest rate and decreases capital and output at home and abroad, and is
accompanied by more than 100X crowding out by home consumption
([dC(W)~dG]TF~ -1) and thus a trade surplus. The home country accumulates
net foreign debt. Real money balances fall on average and they fall more
at home than abroad. This implies that welfare at home falls by more than
welfare abroad. In fact, foreign consumption, real money balances and
welfare may well increase.
When bond issues are the residual mode of government finance, the
relevant steady-state multipliers are (see Appendix):
(dF(m)IdGd)~F - ~(nr3)(af3)(rt8-n) (v -5~)Í(U~d) ' ~(r-n)-1 ~ 0
LdUa(m)ÍdGdj~F - (d~d(m)IdGdj3F - [d:4d(m)IdGdj~F - 0




A bond-financed increase in home government spending leads to a fall in
the world real interest rate and increases in capital and output, both at
home and abroad. This means that there is less than 100z crowding out on
a world scale, that is home plus foreign consumption falls by less than
the increase in home government spending. In the long run the home
country has a trade deficit of half the increase in government spending,
which exactly equals the interest receipts on accumulated foreign assets.
Hence, in the short run there must have been trade surpluses. In the long
run consumption of goods and real money balances are the same in both
countries. The increase in home government spending implies that the home
government cannot afford to service as much government debt, hence the
home country's government debt is lower than the foreign country's
government debt by exactly that amount . Note-27-
that as far as economic welfare is concer:~ed, the effects on the `oreign
country are the same as on the home country.
5.3 Dvnamic oolicv simulation
Table 2 presents the inpact and steady-state of a lv~ joint
tax-financed increase in government spending. On impact the wage
rate, the real interest
rate, capital and output are unaffected. The anticipation of an excess demand
for goods leads to rising prices, so that on impact real money balances fa11
bv 3.39' and inflation rises by 0.02 percentage points. The increase in the
budget deficit is on impact àue to the rise in government spending and fall
in seignorage revenues and must be financed by an increase in taxation of
31.157. The anticipation of lower wages, higher taxes and 'nigher rates of
interest reduces human wealth on impact by 3.ï77, which, combined with the
fa11 in financial wealth, reduces total wealth and consumption by 3.16i on
impact. Since the increase in government spending exceeds the fall in private
consumption, investment fa11s on impact by 0.297,. Social welfare fa11s on
impact by 3.217. Over time prices continue to rise at a decreasíng speed, so
that real money balances, seignorage revenues and taxes continue to fa11. In
the long run, the real interest rate rises by 0.018 percentage points and
therefore output and wages fall by -0.04~, whilst capital and investment fa11
by -0.17'. Hence, in the long run human wealth falls by a further 0.097.
Non-human wealth fa11s by a further 0.097, because of the fall in capital and
additional fa11s in real money balances. Hence, total wealth and consumption
fall by a further 0.097. The long-run fall in socíal welfare also esceeds
the short-run fall.
Table 3 presents the impact and steady-state effects of a 10~
tax-f inanced increase in home goverru~~ent sYenuing . Gn iii~pact tr,e
increase in home government.- -28-
spending leads to a trade dericit of 0.13é of óross output, so that over time
the home country accumuiates foreign debc. In the iong run interest pavments
on foreign assets fa11 (despite a small rise in the world real interest rate),
which permits a balance-of-craàe surplus of 0.057 of gross output. The
anticipation of higher prices iowers real money ba~ances on impact at home
by 3.18i (undershooting the new equílibrium by 0.~77,) and abroad by 0.217.
(overshooting by 0.18'). The short-run home public sector deficit is financed
by a 30.79~ increase in taxation and the foreign deficít (arising from the
fall in seignorage revenues) is financed by a 0.367. increase in taxation.
This increases human wealth on impact at home by 3.~6~ and abroad by 0.217..
Zt follows that total wealth and consumption fall on impact by 2.997. at home
and by 0.18i abroad. In the long run home consumption fa11s by 3.337, whilst
foreign consumoti~n increases by 0.087. Foreign consumpcion increases in
the long run, because the long run ris2 in assets oc the home country held by
foreign agents dominates the fa11s in foreign equity, real money balances and
human wealth. Znstantaneous social welfare fa11s on impact by 3.03' ac home
and by 0.187 abroad, whilst in the long run it falls by 3.367 at home and
increases by 0.107, abroad. TiPn~e~ as far as welfare is concerned,
fiscal contraction is a"locomotive" nolicy in the short run and a
"beggar-thy-neighbour" policy in the lona run.
6. Tax oolicv
6.1 Steady-state e~`ects of a joint increase in taxation
The steady-state multipliers ror bond-rinanced multilateral increases
in lump-sum taxation are (see Appendix) -
LdKaCm)Id~O)3F - - (nf8)(ol3)YCrfe-n)~I~a ~ 0
(dCa(m)Id~O)sF - - (n~S)(alg)Y(rt9-n)(r-n)~I~a ~ 0 (6.2).
-29-
;d~arm) Id;.,; ~F - (n-3) (c-~) ;Y~`--~~ - (i-Y) (r-n) ) ~IGa ~ 0
~
~dDa(m)Id~0i3r - - ;-azlGa ~ 0.
(6.3)
(6.4)
wnen the birth rate is zero, ~ ~ is noc possible to shift the buràen of
higher taxatior. onto future generations anà therefore changes in lump-sum
taxation have no efïects on the real interest rate, capital, output,
consumption cf gooàs anà of real money balances, and total wealth. The
reduction in human wealth resulting :rom an increase in taxation is exactly
off-set by the increase in non-human wealth resulting from an 'ncrease in
government àebt ((dEa(m)Id~~1~F ~-(àBa(m)Id~~;~F ~- 1l(r-n) for n- ~- 0),
which is an ~llustration of Ricardian debt eauivaience.
Now ccnsider the dvnamic aàjustment. On ímpact the long-run 'ncrease
in taxation inol~es a short-run cut ín taxation oí
a
- ~~o~ because
óovernment àebt and the real ínterest rate do not jump on impact. The
resulting governmenc deïicit is -inar.ced by borrowiag, but this raises taxes.
~he increase in L:~e interest.rate leaàs to an increase in interest payments .
on gover..ment àebt, which means ~urtáer increases in Laxatíon. ~he higher
taxes in the 1on7 run finance t;~e ír.terest paymencs on the hígher government-
debt.
:,~nen the ~1rLh ,aLe íS ?ositive, a joinc iacrease in taxation íncreases
the world real interest rate and reduces capital and outpuc at home and
abrcad. This means that cor.sumption of ~oods and raal money balances and
total weaith at home and abroad fa11. ??uman wealth falls by more than non-
Zu:nan wealth. ít fa11s for three reasons: (í) taxes have gone up; (íi)
wage income :as ïallen; and (iii) the higher real interest rate has cut the
~nnuity value of after-tax uage income. Increases ín lump-sum taxation
unambiguously lower welfare.-30-
~,2 ~teaá~~-state effects or a -ateral r.crease -n ahat-or.
:he steaàv-state multipi:ers -or the global àif`erences are ( see Appendix) :
ldF(~)~d~0'BF z - '4(r-n)CI(w-~C) ~ 0
[dCd(m)~d~0'SF s - C~(w-~C) ~ 0
:d-Md(m)Id,0~3F : - `~l(w-;Q) ~ 0





Application of (A. 3 ) and (A. 4 ) yielàs [ dC (m) ~d~U, BF C C, [ d.M(m) ~d~C; BF ~ 0,
,dD(m)~d~C]BF ~ 0,
[àCx(m)~d~p]BF - - [ (r-n)U 1 (n-3) (c13) (D-~-:~!) lYf~~ (r~A-n)C~l ~?~a(w-SC) 1 ~ 0
(6.9)
(du~r(m)~áyo]3F - - { (r~-9-z) (r-n)U t (n-3) (ct3) [ (rle-n) ( D~,~) - (w-~C] }.
Y:~f"~~[?~a(w-~C) l (~0) (6.10)
I ~o~ I~,i211 ar.d ignoring seconá-oràer-ter~s- in ~:.,.., ~-...,,
[áD~ (m) ~á~CJ BF - - ~~~ (n-t~) (CfB) (1-Y) Cf" Cr-n) (rfd-n) 6~ (~a~d)
(6 . 11 )
(whic:~ is positive for ~~ 0 and 's negative t"or 7 ~ 0).
:ience, an unant;cirated, permanent, bond-financed increase in ;~ome
L3X2Líon leads in Lhe long ru:~ Lo a fa11 in :~ome consu:~ption or gooás, a fall
in `~one 'zoldir.gs of real meney balances, an increase ín home government debt,
a fall :a net foreign assets of t!~e home country, a trade surplus, a ríse in
t`.:e world real interest rate, and fa11s ~n investment, capital and output.
Foreign ;~uman wealt:~ fa11s, because wages fall and the real ínterest rate
rises. Obviously, home !~ur..an weaith falls even further due to the increase
in zoTe tar.atior.. coreign consu~:ption of goods and real money balances
'ncreases, so that home welfare falls and foreign welfare increases.-31-
~ -moer'ect subst'tution bet~reen ':~cme anà ~orei,n ~ooès
So ~ar, the two-country modeï àiscussed in this paper incorporated the
"law of one príce". Here the unrealistic assumption ot purchasing power
parity is replaced by the assumption of imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods. It is aiso assumed that each countrv is compieteiy
specialised in production. Rea1 variables (escept F) are now deflated by
the ideal cost-of-livíng index (CPI), say Pc, rather than by the home
price level, P. This means that the analVsis of Sections 2.1-2.4 is as
before, except that p(t) - P(t)IP(t) in equatíons (2.2), (2.4), (2.9)
and (2.14) is replaced by pc(t) - Pc(t)IPc(t). The main changes occur in
Section 2.5
The fírst stage of the consumer's decision problem is to decide on its
total consumption aad savings and thereiore has an intertemporal nature (see
Section 2.1). The second stage is concerned with how much to consume of home
goods, CD, and of foreign goods, C~. With Cobb-Douglas preferences,
consumers choose CD and C~ to maximise the utility function
(CD~w)w(C~~(1-ca))1-w su-oject tn the s-tatic..budget constraint PCD f P~EC`~ - PCC
where E denotes the nominal exchange rate. This yields CD - wPCCIP and
C~ -(1-w)PCC~(vP) where the real exchange rate is defined as v- P~E~P.
U.pon substitutíon into the utility functíon, one obtains che CPI as
pC - Pw(P~E)1-w
so that CD -~,~vl-wC and C~ -(1-w)v-~C. To keep :natters
simple, it is assumed that governments have che same preferences over home
and foreign goods as the private sector so real government spending on home
,
goods is given by GD - wv -wG and on foreign goods ís given by
G~ -(1-w)v-wG. Equation (2.16) is replaced '~y the conditíon for equilibrium
in the home goods markec,
Y- CD {- GD f I t C~ f G~
.
- (PCI?) (C1G) T I t [C~ f G~ - ~~(C`~lG~t) ) , (7.1)M -32-
and tne condition for eauilibrium in che roreign goods mar~cet,
Y~ - C~ 7 G~ t I~ Y C~ f G~
- (P~~p~) (C~`tG~`) t r~ ~. (r~ f G,~ - (CuyG~) ~'~) , (7.2)
where the terms in square brackecs denote t:~e balances of trade. Simílarly,
equation (2.17) describing the current-account dynamics is replaced by
,,. ~~~ ~,.,,.~ p :-~(r-t3)F ~- Y - ~rC~.~ ~~.rv~ -
: (~)F {- [C~~ t G~ - v(C,~G~) ]
Z
(7.3)
where F-(B-D}PC~P and F~ -- F~v. Real non-human wealth of home agents
oiven by A- K t~1 -f- D~- v-(1-w) F and of foreign agents is given by
ís o
~~ - K~ t"~!~ ;- D~ - v-~~c. The condition for uncovered interest parity becomes
r f p - r~ -~ p~ ;- ee or r- r~ ~- (2w-L)ve~v.
c c
The comolete two-country modei with imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods is particularly simple when the share of imported goods is
fífty percent (w-~). because then r- r~ and therefore K- K~, Y- Y~
and w- w~. Subtraction oc (7.1)and (~.2) then yields v- 1, so that
pC - p- P~E. In other words, the special case w-~ corresponds to the
purchasing power parity model discussed in Sections 2-6 The general case
of w~~ can be summarised by ten ordinary differential equations in terms
of K, K~, F, v, U, U~, `i, :'1~, D and D~, where the first three varíables
are assumed to be predetermined and the remaínder are assumed to be non-
predetermined.l ~lternatively, one obtains a sub-system for the global
averages, ( Ka, Ua, :1a, Da)', and an índependent sub-system for the global
àifferences, (Kd, F, v, Ud, `~d, Dd)'. Table 1 shows that the eigenvalues
1 Thís assumes that inítially no gross foreign assets are he1d, so that
jumps in the real e:cchange rate do not lead to jumps in F.Y
-3~-
associated .~ith the ~iobal averages -or the tax-financed case are the same
as unáer ~urcàasing ~ower ~aritv. ~hís is aot so for the global ~ífferences;
there are aow two stable eigenvalues associated with Kd and F and three
aigenvalues associated aith v, Ud and `~d. The global dítferences now
ad;-~st a-~en ycra siowïy, that is they take about 375 rather than 353 tíme
units to sectie down within O.ló of the steady state.
The effects or joint changes in economic policy are the same irrespective
oi whether ?urchasing power parity holds o r home and foreign goods are
imperfect substitutes. Table 3 compares the effects of tax-tinanced increases
in monetary ~rowth under imoerfect substitution between home and foreign goods
and under ~urchasing aower ?arity. The main point co notice is that in the first
case che real exchange rate, ~~, overshoots its equilíbrium value. For a
nonetary expansion it àepreciates by 5.35~ on impact and appreciates by 3.1ï7
in the iong run. cor a fiscal expansion it aopreciates by 0.21i, on impact and
áepreciates by 0.1?é in the Long run. ~1so, investmenc now responds ;nore at
home and ïess abroad in the short run.
8. Concluding remarks
~ two-country, optimising sodel with capital accumulation, floating
exchange rates, uncovered incerest parity, perfect Loresight, finite Lives
and population growth has been formulated- For the special case of a zero
'birth rate, the discount rate used to calculate human wealth is the same as
the discount rate used to calculate non-human wealth and government debt.
Lt follows that for this case individuals are indifferent between tax-cinance
and bond-[inance or money-[inance, so thac :Zicardian debt-neutrality and
super-neutrality hold. Vote that these neutralíties occur in economies where-34-
the probability of death equals the rate of population decline.
Sufficient conditions for these neutralities are infinite lifetimes and
no population growth. The general case of non-zero birth rates is best
analysed by decomposing the system into global averages and global
differences. A tax-financed increase in monetary growth leads to an
interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect, that is the world real interest rate
falls whilst capital accumulation and output increase. A home monetary
expansion leads to an increase in home consumption, a fall in foreign
consumption, a home balance-of-trade deficit, and an increase in home
holdings of net foreign assets. If the monetary expansion occurs through
open-market operations, money is super-neutral. A tax-financed fiscal
expansion leads in the long run to a rise in the real interest rate,
crowding out of private investment, a fall in output, and falls in real
money balances, non-human wealth and human wealth. There is more than
100z crowding out of private consumption of goods. Taxes increase by more
than government spending, because they have to make up for the loss in
seignorage revenues. When government spending is financed by bond issues,
there is less than 100x crowding out, human wealth increases, the real
interest rate falls, capital accumulation increases and the government
debt rises. A home tax-financed fiscal expansion leads in the long run to
more than 100x crowding out by home consumption and a trade surplus,
which finances the interest payments on accumulated foreign debt. A bond-
financed increase in home government spending leads to a long-run trade
deficit and net foreign assets. A bond-financed increase in lump-sum
taxation leads to an increase in the world real interest rate, a fall in
capital and output, a fall in consumption of goods and real money
balances, a fall in human and non-human wealth, an increase in government
debt, and a fall in welfare. A home increase in taxation leads to a trade
surplus, a fall in net holdings of foreign assets, a fall in home welfare
and an increase in foreign welfare.
An interesting area for further research is the optimal
determination of fiscal policy (see Calvo and Obstfeld, 1988) and of
monetary policy. Thisr
-35-
~aises the 'ssue oi aow -he aei`are ~f :íiferent ~eneracions should be weighed
~~a order to conscruct a ~ocíal ~ael~are -unction. The orobLem oi time
~nconsistency arises ~ecause Cantral Banks have an :acencive to Levy a
surpríse 'nílation tax. Obviousiy, ~he arobiem or optimal economic policy
zeeds to Se considered in an interdeoendenc world and therefore issues oi
international policy coordination amerge. ~tosc studies on internacional
?oiicy coordinacion have rocussed on monetary disinilation in two-country,
real-exchange-rate overshooting sodels (e.g., Killer and Salmon, 1985; Currie
and Levine, 1985; Oudíz and Sachs, i985; ~ogotf, 1985). Eiowever, such models
~mply ad-hoc welfare zunctions and thereiore do not permit a proper game-theoretic
anaiysis oï time consistency and the merits oi internacional policy coordination.
Ln two-country opcimising models of optimal taxation, one cinds that ín the
absence oí ~nternacional cooperacion government spending is excessive (Kehoe,
1986, 1987; van der PLoeg, 198ï,19 8 8)".urthermore, international policy
coordínation can aggravate the problems oí credibílity and time inconsístency
so that cooperation becween governments in the absence oF pre-commitment
vis-à-vis the private sector can be counter-productive (Rogoff, 1985; Kehoe,
1986; van der Ploeg, 19 gg), Obviously, it is interesting to investigate the
scope ~or incernational polícy coordínation in che particular two-country
model developed in chis paper. :1n ad-hoc analysis shows that, in the absence
or international policy coordinatíon, monetary growth ís too low, real intezest
rates are too high and capital and outpuc are too Low (van der Ploeg, 1986).
ilowever, the: paper shows that an increase irl homa monetazy growth may well be
a beggar-thy-neighbour polícy as foreign consumption fa11s and therefore there
may we11 be an inflationary bias ín monetary growth~v -36-
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P~`tETER VALUES
z- 3- n- 0.02; ~- O.i; '(K,l; - 0.5~K0'2; .- 0.08; w- O.ïS;
,- 0.0 ~or tax-[inance and ;- i.0 ror bond-rinance; ~0 - 0.051?5;
G- G~ - 0.13; 8-~3~ - 0.07
STE.~DY STATE (svmmetric)
a- 0.52; r- 0.03; p- 0.05; r} p- 0.08;
C- 0.4; L- 0.12; Y- 0.65; t(K) - 0.~5; V- K- 1.0;
x- 9.375; ~. - 3.125; K- 1.25; D- a- 0.875; ~- o;
aM - 0.0875; G-~M - 0.0425; Z- 0.05125;
U- 0.5; Y 1og(C) t- (1-Y)log(M) -- 0.6884.
EIGENVALuES: T~X-FI:iANCE :~ND PURCHASING POWER PARITY
-0.1991, 0.0838 and 0.2153 tor the global averages;
-0.0273, 0.0418 anà 0.0855 for the global differences.
EIGENVALUES: TAX-FINANCE ~ND IMPERFECT SUBSTITUTION
-0.1991, 0.0838 aad 0.2153 Eor the global averages;
-0.3170, -O.Oi84, 0.0324, 0.0848 and 0.2153 for the global
differences.!r
Tabie feccs oi ~oinc, unancicioaced, -3x-~inanced changes in economic
~olicv
~ ~ LOi, increase in ~ 10i, increase in
i ~ monetary growth ~ government spending
i
Percentage czanges in ~~ Lmpact ~, cinal ~ Impact i Final
~
U - U~, C - C~
r - i,t




































-0.288 ~ -0.174 Í
0.0 ~ -0.035 ~
0.0 i -0.174 Í
-3.389 ~ -3.480 ~
-1.356 ~ -L.448 Í
i
-3.ï66 '; -3.857 ~
I 31.153 II 31.308 Í
~ 0.0 ~ 0.018 `
Í 0.018 Í 0.0 Í
i -3.209 Í -3.300 Í
1) var-able, t:~e arithmetic chan e ín ercenta e oints is iven. For this ~ S P g P g
2j Instantaneous welfare is defined as cYml-YgY~ The calculations
assume that government spending is of the "hole-in-the-ground"
variety (Y~ - 0). If it is not, then government spending can increase
welfare (e.g., the final effect is 4.7i, rather than -3.3~ ror Y~ - 0-8).Table 3: Effects of unaciticipated, tax-fínanced clianges in iiome economic policy
107 increase in lOZ increase in I
monetary growth government spending
Purchasing power Imperfect Purcl~asing power Imperfect
Percentage parity substitution parity substltutiun
changes in





U,C -6.703 2.105 -7.0"l2 3.207 -2.989 -3.332 I -2.976 -3.3J5
ll~, C~ 4.486 -1.994 4.805 -3.096 -U.115 0.078 -0.187 Í 0.121
CD - - -5.684 2.414 - ~ -
I
-3.028 ~ -3.344
Cp - - 3.467 -2.303 - - -0.135 Í 0.090
CM - - -11.034 5.585 - - -2-820 ~ -3.468
CM - - 8.817 -5.474 - - -0.344 0.213
v 0.0 0.0 5.350 -3.171 0.0 0.0 -0.209 0.124
b 1~' 2~ 3.443 -1.262 2.365 -1.293 -0.134 0.050 -0.092 U.O50
I 3.695 2.227 4.690 2.227 -0.144 -0.087 -0.183 -0.087
I~ 3.695 2.227 2.700 2.227 -0.144 -0.087 -0.105 -0.087
Y-Y~, w-w~ 0.0 0.445 0.0 0.445 0.0 -0.017 0.0 -().017
K-K~ 0.0 2.227 0.0 2.227 O.U -0.087 0.0 -0.087
M -126.862 -120.000 -127.034 -118.898 -3.177 -3.445 -3.171 -3.488
M~ 5.437 0.902 5.608 -0.200 -0.212 -U.035 -0.219 0.008
FIA 1~ 0.0 26.880 0.0 26.240 0.0 -L.024 0.0 -].050
A -50.745 -21.058 -50.813 -19.956 -1.271 -2.429 I -1.268 I -2.472
(contd.)A~ 2.175 -25.156 2.243 -26.258 -0.085 0.981 -0.088 1.~)Z
li 7.978 9.826 7.575 10.928 -3.561 -3.633 -3.545 -3.67
tl~ 5.256 5.727 5.659 4.625 -0."LOS -0.223 -0.221 -0.18
Z -27.309 -39.025 -27.016 -40.906 ~ 30.791 31.248 I 30.779 31.32
Z~ -9.282 -1.540 -9.575 0.342 Í 0.3G2 0.060 ~ 0.373 -0.01
r-r~ 1) 0.0 -0.232 0.0 -0.232 ~ 0.0 0.009 I 0.0 O.UO'
p 1) 9.613 10.0 9.601 10.0 ~ 0.015 0.0 ,' 0.016 0.0
p~ 1) -0.076 0.0 -0.064 O.U ~ 0.003 0.0 Í 0.003 0.0
Welfare 3) -30.734 -22.316 -31.024 -21.214 Í -3.0'L6 -3.355 I -3.015 -3.39~










) For this varialie, the arithmetic change ín percentage points is given.
Tiiis variable is the ratio of the balance of trade to gross output, that is (Y - C- I- G);Y
for the case of purchasing power parity and [CM -f- CM - v(CM f GM)J~Y for the case of imperfect
substitutíon between home and forelgn goods.
)
5
3~ Welfare ís defined as cYml-Yy
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Appendix
The complete two-country inodel can be summarised by eiaht
nonlinear ordinary differential eauations in terms of eiqht state-
space variables, viz.,
the per-capita capital stock, net foreígn assets, total consumptíon at home
and abroad, real money balances at home and abroad, and real government debt
at nome and abroad:
K - f (K) - nK - '~Y (U~-U~) - ~(GTG~) , K(G) - KG
F- [f' (K) - njF t-gY(U~-U) t-~(G~-G), F(o) ~ F
0
U - [f' (K) - aJL' - (nt6) (at8) (KtM-~DtF) , U(0) - free
U~ - [f ` (K) - a]U~ - (n-~8) (ató) (K~-M~-~D~-F) , U~(o) - free
.'~i - [f' (K) f 6 -nJM - (1-Y)U, ~i(o) - free
:yi~ - (f'(K) f ~~ - nJM~ - (1-Y)U~, M~(0) - free




D~ - {[f'(K) - n]D~ ~ G~ - ~Ó - ~~M~}~(1-sl), D~(0) - DÓ. (A.8)
The deveiopment of the eight state-space variables depends on the paths taken
on by the exogeneous policy instruments, viz., 8, 9~, G, G~, ~D and ~~.
All other variables follow from the eignc state-space variables and the six
e:cogeneous policy instruments: Y- f(K) f óK, C- YU,
I - f (K) f óK - ~Y(UfU~) - ~(G~~`) , Z - ~D - ~1D, r - f' (K) ,
w - f (k) - iCf' (K) , p - (1-Y) (UIM) - f' ( K) , B - D ~- F, ?, - K ~- ~1 T D -~ F
and H- U(ató)-1 - K- K- D- F.
In summary, the above presented a two-country model with finite lives,
aopulation growth, an asset menu cor.sistíng of money, capital and bonds,
purchasing power parity, uncovered interest paríty, floating exchange rates,
labour immobilíty, ir,elastic supply of labour, fu11 employment, perfect
foresight, and Cobb-Douglas preferences.N
-A2-
The world of super-neucralit,~ anà àebt-neutrality will be
abanàoned in ~avour of a world with strictly posítive bi:th rates. This
invoives the fu11 system (p~, 1) -(A.8) . Kowever, when the nonlinear
svstem (A.1)-(A.8) is linearised around a svmmetric steady stace (around
a- 9~ and G- G~), it can be decoupled inco a sub-system for the global
averages and into another sub-system for the global differences (cf., Aokí,
1981) .
The state-soace vector of global averages is
and the instrument vector of global averages is
a a
xa -( Ka , U a, :~I , D)
where a a a
ua - (ea~ G ~ ~p) '
global average is defined as the deviation of the arithmetic average of the
a- K- K(m) and, say,
home and ~~reign level irom its steady-state level (K
Ua - ~[U - UC~)1 The 1ir.earised sub-system for the global
~ïU~ - U~(m) 1).
averages can then be ~written as
(P,. a)
;-~~~i;,-1) ~ 0. The suo-syscem oE gloóai averages, (A.9),
~
~orres~onás to the descri?cion oi a closed world economy and therefore issues
~uch as currenc-account d~~namics do zot ~eature. The saddlepoint ?rooerty
~~ ~ 3uiter, 1984) oi this ?erïect ~oresighc sub-system requires cwo
.--~.,
aigenvalues ~~ith negative real ?arts and two eigenvalues with positive real
oarts corresponding to cwo backward-Looking (predetermined) variables, :~a
and ~3, anà two ïorward-looking ;~ump) variables, Ua and Ka,
respective'y. The ~roduct oL the ~our eigenvalues associated with the sub-
system ~t ~~o'oai averages equals
13 - det(~,1` - .- ~ a~. ~- ~n~-B) (atd) ~ (r-n) (1-y)8 - ~t„~6M - (rtA-n)D) ] J~,
r-nl~,.
~here
p ~ -1 ~ 0
r-n ~ -Y ~ 0 ' p ---'----1--
1-------~-------------~-----------
Uf"-(ntó) (as.g) ; r-a '-(nt6) Cul~) i-(n-~B) (a~-B) a 0 i 0 i-0
~ ----- x f --~---- i
----------------- --------------~-------~- , -
;1f" i-(1-Y) ~ rf8-n ' p ----
M i p i p
--~----~-- F------- i i ------i---------------------~
- -Df"~---
p ~ ~~ (r-n) ~ `sE ~ -~ ~ ~
a
u
3 ~axa f Baua,-A3-
-~nere -::e ~roduct ~í the three ?1?~2nVaLlles- ~sSi7c.aCeá -~ich - he sub-svstem
.a
-or the case oí tax--inance ,; -~J, ~- J) 's 3iven by







r , one ~bCa1nS
~a - - ;' Y (r-n) (r~d-n)Ur" - ~ nT~) (at3) [-~í,,, r~.7-n) ~;~-?4) - i;r-n) (1-Y) (w-Z) I`i) ~ ~ C
ahich is consistent ~aith the saddlepoint ?roperty (given that r- n~ 0 is
~
assumed to hold).`
d ~ c ~á d ,
The state-sDace vecCOr oi ~loóal difíerences is Y-(F, J, , D)
and the instrument ~iector or ~lobai 3ií-erences is ~Sd -'~o, Jd, ~~; , where
a 31oba1 difíerence is defined as the arithmetic difference of the home and
d
íoreign level from its steady-state 1eve1 (e.g., U -[U - U(m)] -[U~ - U~(m)]).
The iinearised sub-system for the global differences can then be written as
~ --n ' -~íY ' 0 ' 0 I
I--------------- ---------------------- - ~ ------~----
-? (nt8) (a-r6) ~ r-a ~ -(nfB) (at6) ~ -(ntó) (a-t6)
-------------J----- ---------------------------
0 ;-(1-Y) ~ r}t3-n i 0
I------------~-----------------------------------I
f 0 ~ 0 ~ 5~ ;-(r-n) E J
~ adxd 1 adud-




Lt is possible to examine under which conditions the saddlepoint property
holds ror the special case oi tax-[inance. It will be assumed that wage
i.ncome is suf~icient to cover Lump-sum taxes ?ius the interest íoregone on
'aolding real ~nonev balances (í.e., w~ Z~(rt8-n)M), so that áTF is
ne3acive.Hence, the tax-finance system has either one stable and two unstable
eigenvalues or three stable eigenvalues. Since the sum of the eigenvalues,
r- n t r- a t r t g- n, is positive (as n ~ r s a t~3 t n is assumed to
hold), the second possibility is ruled out and therefore the saddlepoint
property is satisfied.ti.
-A4-
The sub-system of global dif:erences,lA.10), does noc depend on global activity
variables, so that the current-account dynamics anà the capital-stock dynamics
are decoupled and can therefore be analysed separately. The saàdlepoint
property requires two eígenvalues with negatíve real parts, associated with
the predetermined variables, F and Dd, and two eigenvalues with positíve
real parts, assocíated with the jump variables, Ud and `Id. The product of
the four eigenvalues associated with the sub-system of global differences
equals
~d - det(Ad) - {-(r-n)OTF } (n-t6) (af8) (r-n) (1-Y)3}y
-(:a~) (at") (1-Y) (r-n) (w-Z)~; K - C
where the proàuct of the three eigenvalues associated with che sub-svSCem tor
the case of tax-finance is given by
,TF - - (ntB)(ot8)(1-Y) Lw-Z-BM]~M
which is consistent with the sadàlepoint ~roperty.
The comparative statics of the steady state makes use of







dx~ (m) ~du - - `~[ (aa)
-iBa - (Ad) -1Bd ~ .
(A,1~)
(A.12)
These ex~ressions for the steady-state multipliers can be evaluated analytically
with the aid of Cramer's rule (see Sections 4-() Although the comparative
àvnamics can, in principle, be evaluated analytically, ít is cumbersome and
therefore dynamic adjustment paths for the endogeneous variables are evaluated
numerically. The-t-ansient-p.erfec~-fare~ht trajectories of the linearised
model will be calculated with the aid of Buiter's (1984) method of spectral




It is easy to show that the impact effects on the jump variables
are, for the global averages, aiven by
(A.13)
where ~~. is a diagonal matrix with the two eigenvalues wíth positive real
J
roots of Aa as íts elements, (vjpivjj) is a matrix whose rows concain the
row-eigenvectors associated with the two eigenvalues in .tj, and J is a
I' al a a
x~(o) - I~al - - vj~~j1 (~JP~JJ)JB
u ,
a a
;natrix oL zeroes and ones that pet,nutes ~the second and~-fourth row of ~ ~-
A similar exoression is used for the ~umns in the global
differences.
The parameter values that wi11 be used and the implied eigenvalues
are pr~sented in Table L. It is clear that the eigenvalues of (A-9) and (A.10)
under tax-finance (~-0) are real and satisfy the saddlepoínt property. The
global averages take about 35 time units (-~~n(0.001)10.1991]) whereas the
global dífferences take about 253 time units to settle down within 0.17. of
the steady-state values. The slow adjustment of the global differences is
mainly due to the sluggish nature of the current-account dynamics.II~tlÍ~~~II fl IIpÏIIVÍGIVN~~Nlplll